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State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
No. 7273 
ROBERT S. HARRIES, 
Defendant and Apellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Grand Jury of Salt Lake County, Utah, on June 26, 
1948, returned an indictment against the defendant, 
Robert S. Harries, charging bribery as follows, to-wit: 
''That the said Robert S. Harries, on or about 
the 1st day of December, 1946, at the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, he being then and there an 
executive officer and a person appointed to an exec-
utive office, to-wit: The Chief of the Enforcement 
Division of the Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
received a bribe, to-wit: Money, from Cyrus Lack 
upon an agreement or understanding that his action 
upon a matter which might be brought before him in 
his official capacity would be influenced thereby, to-
wit: Upon an agreement and understanding that he, 
the said Robert S. Harries, would permit and allow 
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Robert Ossana to maintain a building and rooms 
where alcoholic beverages were to· be sold, kept, bar-
tered and stored in violation of the Liquor Control 
Act, and where persons would resort for the <;].rinking 
of alcoholic bever·ages; ******" 
The defendant entered his plea of 'not guilty.' 
(Tr. 6) 
The case came on for trial before the Ron. Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., one of the judges of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, with a jury, on September 13, 1948. 
At the time set and before trial commenced, the 
defendant, by his attorney, made and presented to the 
ccourt his motion, reading as follows : 
'' 1. For an order of this court to the clerk of this 
court for leave to defendant, by his attorney her-ein, 
to inspect and make copy of the stenographic transcript 
of the testimony of the witnesses appearing before the 
Grand Jury and whose names appear on the indictment 
herein. 
2. That the trial of this cause be continued and 
postponed until after such inspection and examination 
by defendant's attorney, and until time sufficient for 
defendant's said attorney to properly prepare for the 
defendant's defense herein. 
3. That the trial of this cause be continued and 
postponed until after the general election next en-
suing.'' 
The motion was supported by affidavit. (Tr. 13). 
The motion was denied. (Tr. 66). 
The jury having been selected and sworn, the Dis-
trict Attorney made a lengthy opening statement. (Tr. 
66-98). 
The case grew out of the doings of one Cyrus .,l. 
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Lack, and the mixture of liquor under the state nlonop-
oly system of disposal and the ideology of prohibition 
in n1atters of enforcement, and the 1nachinations of 
politics. 
The person of Cyrus V. Lack and the strange re-
. gime he manipulated at the Brigham Street Pharmacy, 
would call for the talents of a Dickens for portrayal. 
Appointed to a package agency of the Utah I.-liquor 
Control Commission on Brigham Street, in alignment 
with temples, tabernacles, cathedrals, governors' man-
sions and places of the great, this gnome, "\vhose phil-
iogomy, as reflected in the tabloid· reproductions of the 
petsons of the trial, carried a striking reminder of the 
face of a porcupine encountered in the woods, and his 
tireless and constant nosing-in and doing-for suggested 
the appellation of a busy beaver. That such a one could, 
even under the vapors of liquor and in the smokerooms 
of politics, have entangled himself in the affairs of so 
many decent people, and gained credence to his pre-
tensions, as sworn to by him at this trial, is beyond 
imagination. 
The business of selling liquor at his agency soon 
grew from the bottle at a time tempo to truck load 
lots, and from purveying to the elite neighborhood to a 
statewide distribution. The trial did not tip the lid of 
all this very wide. 
The Grand Jury which returned this indictment 
against Harries came into being from the explosions 
which were caused by the announcement one morning 
that the Brigham Street Pharmacy had been burglar-
ized of three hundred cases of liquor. Lack was charged 
with embezzlement by complaint. The Grand Jury in-
dicted him on the same charge and the prosecution 
was taken over. He was not indicted and has not been 
charged with any of the other crimes which he revealed, 
in his testimony in this trial. He had not come to trial 
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on the indictment of embezzlement and he was not 
indicted in the conspiracy charge which was returned 
against Harries and Leonard. 
The theory of the state's case on this trial was 
made through twenty witnef?ses. It was clearly revealed 
by the opening statement of the District Attorney that 
the scheme of the state was to present a mass of trans-
actions between Lack and various clubs whose members 
seemingly enjoyed the conviviality of the select in the 
cocktail lounge or at the bar. 
· The first direct examination of the witness Lack 
covers seventy pages of transcript. (Tr. 121-191.) He 
was introduced to the defendant by a Mr. McGean. 
Everyone at the trial, except counsel for the defendant 
semed to know what that signified, as he was not fur-
ther identified. And shortly after this meeting in the 
early part of 1946, Mr. Harries budded a candidacy 
for sheriff of Salt Lake County, and.Mr. Lack and _Mr. 
McGean and some others of the capitol crowd seemed 
to take an interest in the matter, and some get-togethers 
were had, and some political money raised, and a pri-
Inary campaign was conducted. The candidate did not 
receive the nomination, but there were some money 
transactions growing· out of these political doings be-
tween Lack and Harries, and after the primary was 
over they went up to West Yellowstone and played the 
games ·and lost, and Harries borrowed some money 
from Lack to keep up his end. 
During this time liquor was rationed, but seemingly 
not to Lack and his customers. He had a scheme. It is 
inconceivable that it was his. own. He could not have 
carried it out without the knowledge and acquiescence of 
the Liquor Control Commission and its distributing 
department, and without them knowing about it. He 
apparently let it be known that if these clubs would 
come to him, he would sell them liquor in wholesale 
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lots at the retail price prescribed by the Liquor CoCn-
trol Commission and would take a pre1nium to himself. 
He engaged in a good deal of double talk in discussing 
it with these people who came to him, but the testimony 
does reflect that with some of them he pretended to 
sell protection from prosecution, except an occasional 
mild knockover, and he pretended to sell Harries in 
this scheme. 
He testified that this was an arranged matter be-
tween him and the defendant. 
At the close of the State's case in chief the trial 
was continued over the weekend. On reconvening the 
attorney for the defendant made his opening state1nent 
to the jury, and said: 
"Since we adjourned on last Friday afternoon we 
have had an opportunity to relax, each one to return 
to his place of residence and to get a breath of fresh 
air. I did also. I went up into my canyon retreat in the 
canyon and to my little farm. I walked across it and 
then walked over into the corner where there is a. 
large pile of barnyard refuse, and I looked at it, and 
I thought what a task to shovel it all away and scatter 
it on the ground. 
''The defendant in this case, and I as his counsel, 
have one task and that is to shovel away the pile of 
barnyard refuse that has been heaped upon him, and 
his testimony and that of his witnesses will be directed 
to that purpose and that purpose only, and to reveal 
at the bottom of that pile a human soul at the core of 
which is integrity, honesty and truthfulness, and who 
is not guilty of taking a bribe, and I shall in throwing 
that refuse off try not to let it fall upon anyone except 
that one who piled it upon us, Cy Lack." (Tr. 616-617.) 
It is repeated here as a concise summary and char-
acterization of the State's case and that which was 
15 
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made by the testimony of the defendant and his wit-
nesses. 
In the course of his opening statement, (Tr. 75), 
the District Attorney mentioned a Mr. Stan Kershaw, 
who was a trustee of the Elks' Club at Ogden, and who, 
according to the District AttQrney, learned of Mr. 
Lack's activities and so came down to Salt Lake City 
to make arrangements with him for the purpose of 
obtaining liquor. At that point counsel for the defen-
dant asked the District Attorney if he intended to call 
Mr. Kershaw, and the District Attorney stated, "No, 
he is dead," and that the evidence 4e had stated would 
come through a conversation Kershaw had had with 
Lack, and counsel for the defendant remarked that this 
would be incompetent on its face, to which the District 
Attorney replied, "Not at all. The theory of this case, 
Your Honor, is that Mr. Lack and Mr. Harries were 
conspirators and the acts and declarations of each in 
furtherance of the conspiracy is admissable." (Tr. 75.) 
The District Attorney then further informed the 
court that a great deal of the evidence would be these 
conversations of Lack with diverse other persons, and 
with respect of transactions not stated or charged in 
the indictment, and counsel for the defendant asked 
the court to limit the District Attorney in his opening 
statement and objected to the statement of intention 
to prove manifestly incompetent matters, which the 
court overruled, ( Tr. 77-78), and the District Attorney 
proceeded to outline in great detail the course his proof 
would take and which would follow the promise sug-
gested that he would try the case as though it were 
a conspiracy case, and the court, throughout the trial, 
permitted this course of testimony. 
Among the witnesses· called by the State were Lee 
A. Williams, of Price, Utah, who operated a so-called 
Country Club thereat, and his testimony wholly related 
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to transactions had between hin1 and Cyrus V. Lack 
and the purchase by Willia1ns of liquor from Lack from 
the Brigham Street Pharnutcy. The witness did not 
testify to any transaction or conversation whatsoever 
with the defendant Harries. 
Parker L. Can1pbell of Salt Lake City, was secre-
tary of the Elks' Lodge there. He was called and gave 
testiinon-y concerning conversations between him and 
Lack out of the presence of Harries, and transactions 
concerning the purchase of liquor by the Elks' Club 
from Lack. He had known Mr. Harries by sight, but 
did not met him personally until sometime in July of 
1947, about eight month's after the time charged in 
the indictment'; and since that Mr. Campbell made a 
deal with Mr. Lack, after rationing went off, to continue 
to pay Mr. Lack $100.00 per month for protection money 
for the Elks' Club. This price was continued, according 
to Campbell, for about four months, and Campbell took 
the money in an envelope to the pharmacy run by Lack 
and gave it to him, or left it with his clerk or attendant 
thereat. On the occasion of his meeting Mr. Harries in 
July, 1947, Mr. Harries jumped down his neck for the 
w~y he was operating the Elks' Club, and the Elks' 
Club was knocked over in October or November of 
1947, and Harries jumped down his neck again for the 
way that they were running the place. He then met 
Harries again at the Brigham Street pharmacy on a 
Sunday morning. Mr. Lack and Henry McGean and 
several others were there, and Mr. Lawrence Johnson 
of the Liquor Commission came in. Mr. Lack there said 
Mr. Harries had double-crossed him and called Mr. 
Harries a number of names, and that the lid had been 
blown off. (Tr. 533-534.) And on cross examination ·Mr. 
Campbell testified (Tr. 538)~ that he went to Harries 
and told him he had found out he had double-crossed 
the Elks' Lodge, and· Mr. Harries then and there told 
him he had had anything to do with it, and he was very 
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indignant about the charge laid against him by lV[r. 
Campbell; and that Mr. Harries told him "when he 
found out Campbell had been paying protection money 
to Lack that he had had the Elks' Club knocked over 
and Campbell was squealing about it, and Ca1npbell 
was angry about it"; and Harries reminded him that 
the Liquor Commission had authorized the locker sys-
tem at the Club and that the Club, through Campbell, 
had been fudging and thought they were buying pro-
tection, and Campbell. gave this testimony: Q: ''And 
then you thought you could get a little extra protection 
when this man Lack fooled you completely by this talk 
and fell for it?" A: "That is right." (Tr. 539.) 
Arnold L. Huber of Salt Lake City, a witness for 
the State, who is manager of the Fort Douglas Golf 
Club, was permitted to tell about buying whiskey from 
Lack and conversations had with Lack about it, and 
this was in May, 1946; and asked about the prices he 
said he couldn't tell you. He wasn't interested particu-
larly; it was just the ~item of getting the liquor; and 
he produced a number of checks, Exhibits "0," "K " 
'' J'' and ''I,'' which he said were purchases of liquor 
from Lack. (Tr. 543-547.) In his direct examination the 
name of Harries was not mentioned. 
Carl W. Sandstrom of Ogden, secretary of the 
Ogden Elks' Club (Tr. 549) became acquainted with 
Cyrus Lack, he testified, at the Brigham Street Phar-
macy through an introduction by S. E. Kershaw, who, 
it appears, had died before the date of trial, but who, at 
the time of the introduction in July of 1946, was Exalted 
Ruler of the Ogden Lodge of Elks, and he thought 
everything was all right and on a legal basis; and it 
had been arranged between Kershaw and Lack that he 
should buy liquor for the Elks' Club through Lack and 
pay a bonus of $15.00 per case, and he related various 
purchases and produced checks and vouchers for the 
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paYJnent for 'vhiskey purchased from Lack; and it 
rather shocked us all that the pre-Christ1nas 1946 pur-
chase 'vas for a hundred cases at a cost of $5997.68, 
Exhibit "B," and this lasted until beyond March, 194 7, 
when the lodge 'vas knocked over for fudging on the 
locker system and paid $100.00 fine, and the sins of 
Ogden were magnified before the :fury, but the name 
of Harries was not mentioned by the witness Sandstrom. 
Kenneth E. Bullock of Provo, who was a trustee 
of the Elks' Club there, testified (Tr. 574). that he met 
Lack and purchased some whiskey from him for the 
Elks' Club in Provo, and some of them ran into near 
shocking size, three-thousand odd dollars at a time for 
the brothers of Provo. This is an interesting bit of 
direct examination of this State's witness, speaking of 
the first check for whiskey (Tr. 576), and before he 
gave him (Lack) the check, he told him that this was 
not "my money" and wanted to know that if I gave 
it to him if everything would be all right. Q: ''Can you 
elaborate on any conversation about everything being 
all right? What did you sa yin that regard?" A: "He 
says, 'If you don't feel good about it, do you know Mr. 
Harries?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'Would you like to talk 
to him?' and I said, 'Well, I don't suppose that is neces-
sary if you are sure everything is going to be all right 
and our club is not going to get in any mix-up on this, 
I think it will be okeh'." Q: "Did he offer to call Mr. 
Harries?'' A: ''Yes.'' Q : ''Did he call Mr. Harries?'' A: 
''No.'' 0 : ''Did you request him not to?'' A: ''No, I 
just said, 'I guess everything will be all right.'' (Tr. 577.) 
And on cross-examination the witness testified that there 
had usually been liquor at the club, but that when they 
couldn't get it there hadn't been any, and they 1nade 
this arrangement with Lack because rationing was on 
and the boys said to get some if it could be bought. (rrr. 
580.) And that is how it came about. All the. business 
was done with Mr. Lack and his agents, and all he had 
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to do was deliver the money when they made out the 
order. (Tr. 581.) 
Robert S. Harries, the defendant, was fifty-four 
years of age at the time of the trial. He was born at 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and had lived there all of his life. 
He was a married man with a family and grandchildren. 
In his early youth, he worked on a farm on the east 
bench and for the railroad in a machine shop. His father 
was ·the former Sheriff of Salt Lake County, and he 
worked for a time as a deputy, and for about four years 
was a guard at Utah State Prison where he became Cap-
tain of the Guards. In 1941 he was appointed to the 
position of Chief Enforcement Officer of the Utah State 
Liquor Control Commission, which he occupied continu-
ously until the return of the indictment herein on June 
27, 1948. ' 
The first witness called by the state at the trial, was 
Henry C. Lunt, a lawyer, and former Assistant United 
States District Attorney, and one of the three commis-
sioners of the Utah Liquor Control Commission, the Re-
publican, or off party member of that by-partisan unit, 
and he produced the oath of office of the defendant in 
which he swore to discharge the duties of. the office with 
fidelity, and Mr. Lunt, after describing in a legalistic 
sort of way those duties, on cross examination, stated 
that in his belief Robert S. Harries performed the duties 
of that office with fidelity. (Tr. 108-109). It was also 
disclosed to the jury by the testimony of Mr. Lunt that 
the Attorney General of the State had rendered an opin-
ion upon the' Liquor Control Act to the Utah Ijiquor 
Control Commission to the effect that it was not unlaw-
ful for a permitted person who had lawfully purchased 
liquor from the Utah Liquor Control Commission, to 
take it, I assume by lawful means, if there be any, to a 
private club, "an old line club," as it was called, like 
the Elks, the Legion, the Moose, the Eagles, and maybe 
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and there, if he could not consume the whole bottle at 
a single session of solitary i1nbibing, he might put it 
in a locker and hie hi1n thither at a later date to finish it. 
(This 'vriter is incorrectly quoted in the transcript 
of this case as having in effect agreed with Mr. Lunt, 
and the Commission, and the Attorney General, in that 
interpretation of the law.) (Tr. 111.} This argument is 
pertinent to an understanding of this case. 
Everything that any witness testified to concerning 
the conduct of this defendant, except only the 'vitness 
Lack, was and is within the cloak of the tolerance pre-
scribed by the Utah Liquor Control Commission, and 
was under the immediate supervision and direction of 
Mr. Lunt, in charge of enforcement. Mr. Lunt was asked 
this question: Q: ''And that was, (the opinion of the 
Attorney General) in substance, that it was not unlawful 
for a person to buy liquor from the State Store, and 
then put it in a locker, individually controlled by him, 
by a key, in a private club, and then take it out of that 
locker and put it upon a bar in that place and have the 
attendant, the bartender, pour in the mixer, and furnish 
the water and service the drinking, even though a great 
number of persons of similar privilege met there for the 
purpose of consuming liquor at that place?'' To which 
he answered: A: "It wouldn't go that far." And the 
question was : ''What detail of that is excessive?'' And 
the answer: "That a member of a club could take it into 
the club and could consume his own liquor in the club, 
and could treat his friends in the club, the same as you 
do in your own home.'' And to this I, as attorney for the 
defendant said: "Sir, I cannot lawfully treat my friends 
in my home under the liquor law of the State of Utah, 
as I have read it, and I have read it many times, and I 
cannot lawfully give another a drink out of my bottle," 
but I am quoted in the transcript as saying: "I can law-
fully treat-I can lawfully give.'' 
And that commission laid down the policy and di-
ll 
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rected its application with respect to clubs of not bother-
ing them for operating liquor bars under the locker sys-
tem, and the degree of tolerance related to the provision 
of the law that it makes it unlawful for a person or com-
pany, or anyone else, to maintain a place where persons 
resort for the purpose of drinking liquor, or consuming 
liquor. (Tr. 115.) And he was asked this question and 
gave this answer: Q. ''So, upon that provision you shut 
your eyes and established a .policy of tolerance?" A. "I 
don't know as we shut our eyes, but we figured as a 
practical proposition that it was a good thing, because 
then the club itself would have no excuse to handle liquor 
itself." (Tr. 115) 
He further amplified the policy on questioning by 
the District Attorney to the effect that the clubs definitely 
understood that they could not sell or resell liquor. (Tr. 
116.) This policy, he said, was at first limited to the old 
line clubs which had already been established, and then 
he said: ''Then we had a number of private chartered 
clubs mushrooming, getting charters from the Secretary 
of State, and we met with the Secretary of State and 
had an understanding that hereafter any of these non-
profit clubs applying for a charter, they would notify 
our office and we would make an investigation.'' 
It was further disclosed by Mr. Lunt that this locker 
system restricted to members made it practically impos-
sible to get a case of violation in the event a club fudged 
on the tolerance, because the enforcement officers would 
have to plan on getting a member to snitch on his own 
fraternity, or plant a phony membership to get a viola-
tion, and that at times special agents were employed who 
were members of various clubs, to go in and detect vio-
lations which would result in raids and a number of them 
were closed, but whenever the enforcement department 
had any evidence of sale by the club, whether by under-
cover agents or personally observed by inspectors, they 
were prosecuted and whenever there was any liquor 
12 
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there that could not be accounted for as being owned by 
club members, it was seized and prosecutions were made. 
(Tr. 118.) And the testiinony in the case developed that 
raids and prosecutions resulted under the .direction of 
Mr. Harries upon every one of the institutions that had 
been mentioned, except the Alta Club, and it was the 
policy of the legal departn1ent of the con1mission in pre-
paring cases, that the enfqrcement division should get 
a series of sales, if possible, and when a series of sales 
could be established, a nuisance or abatement proceed-
ings under the equity provisions of the statute would 
be instituted, and that the kind of case and the final 
decision with respect to it rested with ·the legal depart-
Inent, rested in the lawyers' hands. And when the case 
was presented to the court, recommendations were made 
and the judge fixes a fine and penalty. (Tr. 119.) We 
have all been part of this procedure. I 
Running along with this situation was the shortage 
of liquor during the war, and for a short time after the 
cessation of hostilities, socalled rationing invited a black-
marketing in liquor as in other commodities that were 
short. 
The defendant called sixteen witnesses. Eight of 
them gave testimony of his good. character. The trial 
consumed eight days court time. The typewritten record 
of the procedings covers 818 pages. 
At the close of the presentation of evidence by the 
State, the defendant moved the court for an instruction 
to the jury to return a verdict of 'not guilty' which was 
denied. (Tr. 31 and 616.) And then at the close of the 
case defendant again requested an instruction to the 
jury for a directed verdict of 'not guilty,' which was 
not given. (Tr. 31.) · 
The defendant moved for new trial (Tr. 49-51) on 
ten statutory grounds. 
13 
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Ground No.2 was that the jury received communica-
tions out of court referring to the· cause. This ground 
was supported by the affidavit of Arthur Woolley, attor-
ney for the defendant, and had to do with a statement 
made by His Excellency, the Governor of the State of 
Utah, the Honorable Herbert B. Maw, during the course 
of the trial and issued and caused to be published in the 
Deseret News, a newspaper p.ublished in the county and 
read by jurors. The statement was evidentiary in char-
acter and upon and specifically pertaining to the testi-
mony that had been given by witnesses at the trial, in-
cluding the defendant, and was highly prejudicial to him. 
The statement, as published in the Deseret News, is at-
tached as an exhibit. (Tr. 53-54.) 
The motion for new trial was denied. (Tr. 52.) 
The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment in 
the State prison. (Tr. 48.) Certificate of probable cause 
for an appeal issued and defendant admitted to bail. 
Notice of appeal was immediately given, October 2, 1948. 
(Tr. 58.) 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The defendant relies for a reversal of the judgment 
against him upon the following errors occurring at the 
trial: 
1. The refusal of the court of leave to defendant by 
his attorney to inspect and make copy of the steno-
graphic transcript of the testimony of witnesses appear-
ing before the Grand Jury, and whose names appear 
upon the indictment herein. The statute gives to the ac-
cused the right of inspection and it was an abuse of 
discretion and error for the court to deny to the defen-
dant this right. The transcript of the testimony was, on 
September 9, 1948, for the first time, lodged with the 
Clerk of the court, and the stenographic and transcribed 
testimony of the witnesses named upon the indictment 
14 
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('vhich had been returned June 26, 1948) was then first 
available, and defendant, by his attorney, made demand 
on September 11, 1948, upon the Clerk of the court for 
leave to inspect and read the said stenographic and 
transcribed testin1ony of the witnesses named upon the 
indictment, which demand the Clerk denied, and the de-
fendant, by motion to the court, moved for an order of 
leave to inspect. (Tr. 13-16.) 
2. The refusal of the court to grant a continuance 
and postponement of the trial until. after inspection and 
examination by defendant's attorney of the ,stenographic 
and transcribed testimony of the witnesses named upon 
the indictment, and until time sufficient for defendant's 
attorney to properly prepare for defendant's defense of 
the cause. err. 15-16.) 
3. The refusal of the court to grant a continuance 
and postponement of the case until after the general 
election next ensuing. ( Tr. 15-16.) 
4. The rulings of the court during the course of the 
delivery by the District Attorney of his opening state-
ment to the jury of his intention to prove incompetent 
and hearsay conversations. (Tr. 65-98.) 
5. The court erred in overruling defendant's objec-
tion to the question, "Will you tell us what was said in 
the co~versation ?" (Tr. 129.) This question called for 
a conversation out of the presence of the defendant and 
had between the witness Lack and the witness Ossana 
and one Harold Leonard; and the court erred in receiv-
ing the testimony of the witness Lack in respect to said 
question and subsequent questions upon the same con-
versation and transaction, and all thereof is incompetent, 
irrevelent and immaterial. It was pure hearsay. as to the 
defendant and did not pertain to the charge in the 
indictment. (Tr. 129-132.) 
The court suggested that the defendant, by his coun-
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sel, need not state the objections to this line of testimony, 
and that the objection would be deemed to be stated and 
overruled and the conversations would be received as 
though objectioned to, and exceptions taken, and the de-
fendant relies upon this record, (Tr. 132), with respect 
to this and all similar testimony. 
6. The court erred in permitting the witness Lack 
to testify concerning and relating to a conversation and 
conversations had between him and Ossana out of the 
presence of the defendant. (Tr. 131-133.) 
7. The court erred in permitting the witness Lack 
to relate conversations and transactions had betw-een 
Lack and·one Kershaw, who was dead. (Tr. 141.) 
8. The court erred in admitting in evidence con-
versations between the witnes·s Lack and one Sandstrom 
out of the presence of the defendant. (Tr. 142-145.) 
9. The court erred in admitting in evidence conver-
sations betwen the witness Lack and Parker Campbell, 
and transactions between Lack and Campbell out of the 
presence of the defendant and not in any manner related 
to the charge in issue. (Tr. 150-167.) 
10. The court erred in admitting in evidence con-
versations between the witness Lack and one Lee Wil-
liams, and transactions had between them out of the 
presence of the defendant and not in any manner related 
to the charge la_id in the indictment. (Tr. 154 et seq.) 
11. The court erred in admitting in evidence con-
versations between the witness Lack and one Tony Nikas 
concerning other and different transactions and matters 
than those charged in the indictment and pertaining to 
a political campaign. (Tr. 163 et seq.) 
12. The court erred in receiving in evidence a con-
versation had between the witness Lack and Duke Hatsis 
out of the presence of the defendant, and giving the 
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following testin1ony: Q: ''Did you have a talk with Duke 
before he left?" A: H Yes, I told him ·Mr. Harries would 
pay him for the delivery." ( Tr. 169.) 
13. The court erred in admitting in evidence con-
versations had betwen the witness Lack and Ossana out 
of the presence of the defendant and not related to the 
n1atter charged in the indictment. (Tr. 170 et seq.) 
14. The court erred in receiving in evidence con-
versations between th witness Lack and Bob Bullock 
out of the presence of the defendant and not related to 
the matter charged in the indictment, and in receiving 
evidence of transactions between the witness Lack and 
the witness Bullock of the Provo Elks Lodge (Tr. 176 
et seq.) 
15. The court erred in receiving in evidence con-
versations between the witness Lack and the witness 
Huber, of the Fort Douglas Club, out of the presence 
of the defendant and pertaining to matters not related 
to the matters charged in the indictment. (Tr. 182 et seq.) 
16. The court erred in sustaining the objection of 
the State to the following question put to the witness 
Lack on cross-examination: Q : ''Mr. Lack, will you now 
please tell the jury the story of the burglary in your 
pharmacy?," and in refusing to permit the defendant, 
by his counsel, to cross examine the witness Lack upon 
the claimed burglary at the pharmacy and matters touch-
ing his motive and credibility. (Tr. 192-193.) 
17. The court erred in receiving in evidence con-
versations between the witness Ossana and Lack out of 
the. presence of the defendant. ( Tr. 277-278-279-290-283-
286-290-295-296-298.) 
18. The court erred in overruling the objection of 
the defendant to the following question on direct examin-
ation of the witness Ossana and in permitting the wit-
17 
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ness to give testimony as follows: Q: ''Why did you 
purchase liquor from Cy Lack if you could get it for the 
regular retail price at the liquor store?" A: "Well, he 
told me what he could. do for me and· let me know what 
was going on, and I would get some protection. That is 
the reason I bought fro1n Cy Lack.'' ( Tr. 321.) 
19. The court erred in overruling the defendant's 
objection to the question put to the witness Meyers and 
in receiving the following testimony in response thereto : 
Q : ''How did you know?'' A : ''Well, Mr. Ossana, being 
my partner, told me.'' ( Tr. 356.) 
20. The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the questions· and in permitting the witness 
Meyers to give testimony as follows: Q: ''Had you ever 
been advised, Mr. Meyers, that Mr. London was coming 
down there to your premises?'' A: ''Yes sire, I was ad-
vised.'' Q : ''Who advised you he was coming down?'' 
A : "Mr. Ossana." Q : "Did he tell you when he was com-
ing?'' A : ''He didn't exactly tell me he was coming, but 
he told me to watch for him." (Tr. 363.) And the follow-
ing question and answer: Q: ''How did you know that 
fact, that he was supposed to be dressed that way?" 
A: ''Mr. Ossana told me so.'' (Tr. 364.) 
21. The court erred in admitting in evidence con-
versations between the witness Lack and one Tony Nikas 
out of the presence of the defendant and not related to 
the matter charged in the indictment. (Tr. 402-403-404-
405-406.) . 
22. The court erred in receiving in evidence a con-
versation had between the witness Lack and the witness 
Tony Natsis out of the presence of the defendant. (Tr. 
458.) 
23. The court erred in receiving testimony by the 
witness Duke Harsis concerning a transaction with the 
witness Lack, and conversations with the Witness Lack 
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out of the presence of the defendant and in nowise re-
lated to the Inatter charged in the indict1nent. (Tr. 47·2-
473.) 
24. The court erred in receiving in evidence a con-
versation had between the witness Lack and the witness 
Jensen out of the presence of the defendant and not 
related to the 1natter charged in the indictment, and per-
mitting the witness Jensen to testify coneerning a trans-
action with the witness Lack and the delivery of whiskey 
to the Elks' Club in Ogden. (Tr. 490-491.) 
25. The court erred in receiving in evidence and in 
permitting the witness Lund to testify concerning an 
alleged transaction with Mr. Harries in the month of 
May or June, 1946, and not pertaining to the matter 
charged in the indictment, and the testimony being of-
fered and received over the objection of the defendant 
that the same is incompetent, irrelevent and immaterial 
and not related to anythting stated in the indictment. 
(Tr. 500-502.) 
26. The court erred in receiving in evidence a con-
versation had between the witness Lack and the witness 
Lee A. Williams out of the presence of the defendant. 
(Tr. 509-514.) 
27. The court erred in receiving in evidence con-
versations had between the witness Lack and Parker I.~. 
Campbell out of the presence of the defendant and not 
relating to the matter cha~ged in the indictment. (Tr. 
523-528.) 
28. The court erred in receiving in evidence conver-
sations had between the witness Lack and Arnold L. 
Huber out of the presence of the defendant and concern-
ing other and different transactions and matters than 
those charged in the indictment, and not related to the 
charge laid in the indictment. (Tr. 543-546.) 
29. The court erred in receiving in evidence conver-
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sations and transactions had between the witness Lack 
and Carl W. Sandstrom concerning other and different 
transactions and matters than those charged in the in-
dictment and out of the presence of the defendant. (Tr. 
549-563.) 
30. The court erred in admitting in evidence con-
versations between the witness Lack and one Kenneth E. 
Bullock and transactions had between them and out of 
the presence of the defendant, and not in any manner 
related to the charge laid in the indictment. (Tr. 574-
578.) 
31. The court erred in overruling the objection of 
the defendant to Exhibit "L," and in receiving the same 
in evidence, the same being incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial. (Tr. 584-585.) . 
32. The court erred in sustaining the objection of 
the State to the question put to the witness Lunt on cross 
examination. Q: "And what occurred?"; (Tr. 598) and 
in sustaining the. objection to the question and refusing· 
to permit the witness to answer the question on cross 
examination: Q: "What did you say?" (Tr. 598); and 
the question: Q: ''What further did you do digging in?'' 
(Tr. 598.) 
33. The court erred in sustaining the objection of 
the State to a question put to the witness Lunt on cross 
examination. Q: "What did you do, you and Mr. Harries, 
digging in?" (Tr. 599.) 
34. The court erred in sustaining objections of the 
State. to the questions on cross examination of witness 
Lunt, and in refusing to permit the witness Lunt to 
answer the following questions: Q: ''Did you have a 
meeting with the Governor upon the matter?" (Tr. 599); 
and the question: Q: ''Did you succeed, Mr. Lunt, in 
securing the withdrawal of the Lack Agency?" (Tr. 
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and ~1r. Harries do to dig into this thing?" A: "Later 
on along about the first of December, Co1nn1issioners 
l?eterson, Johnson and n1yself and ~{r. Harries met with 
the Governor in his office at the State Capitol. The pur-
pose of the mission "; Q: "What occurred?" (Tr. 
600.) 
35. The court erred in sustaining the objection of 
the State to a question put to the witness Harries on 
direct examination, referring to the testimony of Steve 
Nikas and his wife in the trial concerning the Diamanti 
knockover at Price, Utah, and in refusing to permit the 
witness to give testimony in response to the following 
question: Q: "What was the nature of their testimony?" 
(Tr. 714); and in refusing to permit the witness to tes-
tify in accordance with the offer of testimony by the 
witness out of the presence of the jury, as follows: Q: 
''Mr. Harries, will you state the subject of the testimony 
given by Steve Nikas and his wife in the trial or pre-
liminary hearing in the Diamanti case?'' 
Mr. Roberts: ''To which may we have our objection 
that it is immaterial and hearsay?" 
The Court: "Yes; and the objection will be sus-
tained, but he may make his offer." 
Q: ''It is a fact, is it not, Mr. Harries, that those 
witnesses, after being sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, testified in that case, 
in behalf of he Liquor Commission and the State in the 
prosecution of that Inatter to the effect that they had 
been in the Diamanti place of business, and had seen 
drinks served there, and had purchased drinks there and 
lmew the nature of its operation?" 
A: ''That is correct.'' 
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• 
A: "That is correct." (Tr. 730-731.) 
36. The court erred in denying defendant's request 
at the close of the taking of testimony in the case for a 
directed verdict of "not guilty" and in refusing to in-
struct the jury to return a verdict of ''not guilty of the 
charge." (Tr. 8}4.) 
37. The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction numbered 1 in the list of requests, 
and particularly the last paragraph thereof. (Tr. 877.) 
38. The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
in accordance with the defendant's requested Instruction 
No. 2. (Tr. 877.) 
39. The court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance wit4 the defendant's requested In-
struction No. 6. ( Tr. 877.) 
40. The court erred in giving the instructions to 
the jury as given by the court and to the whole thereof 
for the reason and on the ground that the same do not 
contain a complete statement of the law and matters 
upon which the jury must, of necessity, have been in-
structed in the case and upon the evidence as received 
by the court and permitted to go to the jury and intro-
duced by the State over the' objections of the defendant, 
and the limitation and extent to which said evidence 
might be considered by the jury, particularly with re-
spect to the numerous and diverse matters of hearsay 
and conversations between Cyrus V. Lack, the witness, 
and several persons called as witnesses and otherwise, 
and out of the presence of the defendant. (Tr. 877.) 
41. The court erred in the giving of the last para-
graph of the Court's instruction No. 6. ( Tr. 878.) 
42. The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. (Tr. 51-52.) 
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POINTS 
I. The right of the accused to inspect and make 
copy of the stenographic transcript of the testimony of 
the u·itnesses appearing before the Grand Jury, and 
1chose names appear upon the indictment. 
The legislature of 1947 amended the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure relating to Grand Juries. By this amend-
m~nt (105-19-9), the Grand Jury was required to appoint 
a competent stenographic reporter to attend sessions of 
the Grand Jury and report in shorthand the testimony 
given before it, and it is made the duty of this stenog-
rapher to transcribe all of the testimony of the wit-
nesses whose names are inserted or endorsed upon the 
indictment as witnesses, as well as that of the accused; 
two copies of the testimony so transcribed must be made, 
one to be delivered to the clerk of the court and one to 
the District Attorney. The clerk may not divulge the 
contents of any transcript except upon written order of 
the court duly made after hearing, the person in whose 
custody said copy is placed. 
A subsequent section (105-19-10) provides that any 
person at any time present at any session of the Grand 
Jury may be required by any court to disclose the testi-
mony of a witness examined before the Grand Jury for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with 
that given by the witness before the court, or to dis-
close the testimony in case of a trial for perjury. 
To furnish a copy of all of the testimony of the wit-
nesses against an accused to the District Attorney, and 
to deny to the accused the same information would put 
the accused to great disadvantage upon his trial. The 
power lodged in the court to direct the clerk to disclose 
the testimony is not limited. True, it is not specific. It 
could not be assumed that this disclosure should be made 
to the merely curious, nor could the purpose be assun1ed 
to have been to make it available to the press. Believing 
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that the fair intendment of this act is that as a matter 
of right the accused is entitled to know not only the 
names of the 'witnesses against him, but their testimony, 
the same whether the prosecution is by indictment as it 
is when the prosecution is by complaint and information, 
and that it was to afford this protection and opportunity 
for defense of accused persons, on first learning that 
the copy of the testimony against this defendant taken 
before the Grand Jury had been lodged with the clerk 
of the court, we made demand upon the clerk, who re-
fused us access, and then we moved the court for an 
order to the clerk to perinit the inspection. This was 
denied. 
True it is, that during the course of the trial, when 
the witness Lack was turn~d over for cross-examination, 
we again made demand for t~e right to inspect and use 
on impeachment the copy -of his testimony before thet 
Grand Jury, upon the assertion, made on information 
and belief, that he had given testimony before the Grand 
Jury contrary to and in conflict with that which he had 
given upon direct examination at the trial, and the court 
awarded us this right in part, that is to say, portions of 
his testimony were permitted to be inspected and read 
on impeachment. This did not cure the wrong done in 
the deprivation of the right of inspection, if it exists, 
before trial, and especially with respect to the other 
witnesses. There were numerous witnesses endorsed up-
on the indictment. The defendant was required to go to 
trial without knowing what any of them had said or 
would say. 
II. The right to a continuance until after inspec-
tion of the stenographer's notes. 
We made demand for continuance of the trial until 
after the inspection above mentioned had been made 
and for sufficient ti1ne for defendant's attorney to prop-
erly prepare for defendant's defense of the cause after 
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such inspection, and this wa!' denied by the court, and 
of course, if the right of inspection existed the refusal 
to grant continuance to pern1it an effective inspection 
was a wrongful refusal. 
III. The defendant was deprived of a fair trial by 
reason of the political times. The trial was set and called 
and held during a political campaign and on the eve 
of a general election in which the office of governor and 
the other state offices including the attorney general, 
and including the office of the trial judge and the district 
attorney were at stake, and in which all of the mud and 
rnuck of liquor enforcement for nearly a decade was be-
ing stirred and smeared about. The defendant moved for 
a continuance until after the election. It will be said 
that this is a rna tter of discretion of the trial court. If 
we will be recall the course of political argument and 
harangue and manipulation, and the thrice daily scream-
ing headlines in the tabloids during the period of this 
trial, I think we now, in retrospect, would all say it was 
un fair to try this defendant then and in that atmosphere. 
IV. The defendant was deprived of a fair trial by 
reason of the rulings of the court upon matters of 
evidence. 
(a) The statement of the District Attorney of inten-
tion to prove and the reciption in evidence of testimony 
of other incidents and transactions of alleged bribery 
by taking or receiving part of the overcharge made by 
Lack upon the sale of liquor to others than Ossana. 
(b) Conversations out of the presence of the defen-
dant between Lack and divers other persons, Ossana and 
his partner, Myers, and also numerous persons not in 
any manner connected with the matter charged ·in the 
indictment. The details of these conversations and the 
record upon this are stated in the Statement of Errors, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31. 
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(c) The testimony of. the witness Lund received 
over the objection of the defendant concerning an alleged 
transaction between the defendant and the witness Lund 
in May or June of 1946, was incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial. (Assignment 25.) 
How far may the hearsay rule be relaxed? 
In this case, and in the instances of hearsay men-
tioned in the assignments of error, there are a number 
of steps. In fact, there is scarcely any kind of hearsay 
that was not admitted against the defendant. 
The District Attorney invoked the rule of relaxation 
in conspiracy cases, and the court seemed to have in mind 
that kind of case in the rulings. 
The Erwin case 
State vs. Erwin, 101 Ut. 365, 120 Pac. (2d) 285 
was in the experience of court and counsel. Here we have 
to do with a charge of specific act of bribery. We have no 
instance in which the accused, Harries, has made any 
statement. The. conversations and declarations which are 
assigned as error were made by Lack to others, or by 
others to Lack, and in some instances, Osanna was allowed 
to relate his conversations with others, and Myers was 
allowed to tell what Osanna told him. Conversations be-
tween third persons have been received in evidence in 
prosecutions for bribery where it appears that the money 
was obtained from them for the purpose of bribery in 
order that the jury may see the connection between the 
source from which the money came and the accused, and 
some conversations between Lack and Osanna might prop-
erly have been received subject to the limitation and pro-
tective rule against credence to accomplices. In this case 
conversations between Lack and Kershaw, a dead man, 
were received. Conversations between Lack and Sand-
strom with respect to the Ogden Elks transactions, and 
the transactions with the Provo Lodge of Elks, and with 
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the Country Club at Price, and with the Elks Club in 
Salt Lake City, and the Fort Douglas Golf Club. In other 
words, conver_sations of the other instances claimed were 
received, not conversations between the defendant and 
any of these persons, but conversations between Lack and. 
these persons, and there is no pretense that the conver-
sations or the acts resulting from them were brought horne 
to the accused. In only one instance was Mr. Harries 
ever confronted '""ith anything growing out of these 
extraneous instances and transactions. Mr. Campbell of 
the Salt Lake Elks Club did come to Mr. Harries, he 
testified, after the Elks Club was knocked over, and 
accused Harries of doublecrossing, and Mr. Harries, in 
effect, gave him the lie, so that this would not seein to 
connect up or warrant a consideration by the jury of 
the conversations between Lack and Campbell by which 
Campbell was received. 
(d) The evidence produced by the State as Exhibit 
"L", and received in evidence over the objection of the 
defendant was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial 
and error. 
(e) On cross examination of the witness Lunt, de-
fendant was not permitted to inquire into and further 
disclose the full acts and conduct of the witness, Lunt, and 
the defendant, Harries, concerning an investigation made 
by them of the charges of corruption contained in the 
anonymous letter testified to by the State. This was 
clearly a deprivation of the right of the defendant of 
full disclosure, and an undue limitation upon the cross 
examination of the witness. (Assignments of error 33, 
34, 35.) 
(f) The co·urt refused the witness, Harries, to give 
testimony concerning testimony given by the witnesses 
used by the Liquor Control Commission and the State 
of· Utah upon the trial of Diamanti, snch testimony going 
to the guilt of Diamanti, and offered upon this trial by 
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the defendant to establish his integrity in the prosecu-
tion of Diamanti, an issue of importance in the theory of 
the State's case, and it was manifest error for the court 
to refuse to admit this testimony as offered. (Assignment 
36.) 
V. The motion and request for an instruction for a 
directed verdict of' not guilty. 
At the close of the State's case, the defendant moved 
for a directed verdict, which was . denied; and ·at the 
close of the taking of the testimony in the case the de-
fendant again requested the court to instruct the jury 
to return a verdict of not guilty. In each case exception 
was taken. 
The refusal of the court to so instruct was error for 
reason that upon the whole case and all of the testimony 
of the State and all of the testimony in the case, there 
was and is not suffcient competent evidence by way of 
corroboration of the testimony of the witness Lack and 
the witness Ossana to 'varrant a submission of the case 
to the jury as matter of law. 
This indictment charges that on or about December 
1st, 1946, Robert S. Harries received a bribe from Cyrus 
Lack. The District Attorney, in his opening statement, 
identified the transaction as occurring in November of 
1946. That Mr. Ossana had made a purchase of about 
thirty or thirty-five cases and made a premium payment 
and Mr. Lack divideq that money with Mr. Harries, 
''and this is the incident upon which the complaint or 
the specific crime· is charged in the Information." Mr. 
Lack says he remembers counting out the money on the 
counter which was some of the Ossana money and he 
remembers that Mr. Young walked up. (Tr. 22.) The 
witness, John W. Young, mentioned by the District 
Attorney and the witness Lack, testified (Tr. 503) he 
was employed at the Brigham Street Pharmacy and he 
recalled the occasion of his introduction to Mr. Harries, 
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and then gave the following testimony: Q. ''Do you 
recall a transaction that you saw betwee_n Mr. I-Iarries 
and Mr. Lack?'' A. ·~Only on one occasion.'' Q. ''Could 
you place the time of this occasion, please?'' A. ''Not 
exactly, but it was the latter part of November.'' Q. ''Of 
what year, please?" A. "1947." Q. "Was it last year or 
th year before; was it this last November or the yea1· 
before?'' A. '' 1946. Why I know it was 1946, I will tell 
you why. I went back on October 14,- 1947, and I never 
seen Mr. Harries after that." Q. "You never saw him 
after that?" A. "No, sir." Q. "How do you place this 
time as being the latter part of November of 1946?'' 
A. ''Well, it was around Thanksgiving time and I was 
quite busy getting my liquor lined up for the rush on 
Thanksgiving." Q. '·'Will you tell us what you saw, 
please?'' A. ''Well, it was in the afternoon. I couldn't 
tell you the exact time, but I just happened to not have 
a customer and I went back to get a drink, and while I 
was taking the drink I seen Mr. Lack standing at the 
prescription pharmacy counting out some money and 
Mr. Harries says, 'Cy, we can make some money on this 
deal.' And I set my cup down and walked back to the 
counter to take care of some customers who had come 
in while I was getting the drink.'' 
Mr. Roberts-Cross-examine. 
The Court: "Mr. Young, who is it said, 'Cy, we can 
make some money on this deal?' '' A. ''Mr. Harries.'' 
Q. (by Mr. Roberts) "Your ·answer was--." A. "Mr. 
Harries." Q. "Mr. Harries?" A. "That is right:" Q. "Do 
you see him here in the court room?'' A. ''Yes, I do.'' 
Q. "And is that the gentleman at the end of the counsel 
table?" A. "Yes." Mr. Roberts: "And may the record 
indicate he points to RobertS. Harries, the defgendant?" 
The Court: ''The man at the end of the counsel table?'' 
A. ''Yes, Sir; sitting right over there.'' The Court: ''The 
record may so show." (Tr. 504-506.) 
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This is the su1n total and the whole of the testimony 
offered and received in this case of the giving and re-
ceiving of a bribe on the date and occasion charged in. 
the indictment, except the testimony given by the wit-
ness, Lack. This Pharmacy was a public store. This 
witness saw, he says, Lack give Harries money. Whether 
change or on what account or in what kind of deal, if 
there was a deal, it is not reflected or disclosed. Does 
this corroborate an accomplice sufficient to put this 
accused on trial? If not, it was the duty of the court in 
this case as rna tter of law to direct a verdict of not 
guilty. 
The sufficiency of the corroborative evidence in thiH 
case is a question of impression. It would require, I 
think, a careful reading of the entire record, a winnowing 
out of all of the extraneous matters, the other instances 
of claimed sales and the premium price and all of that. 
Other instances of claimed wrong which were ad-
mitted under the theory that they would reflect an intent 
or the intention of the accused in the charged case, may 
not be used as corroboration. The corroboration must go 
to the specific charge. The bribery; itself, as laid in the 
indictment, occurred in Salt Lake City and was testified 
to vageuly by the witness, Lack, and the witness, Young, 
and his testimony is, I submit, the whole of the corrobo-
ration on this record. If Young saw Lack hand money 
to Harries and heard Harrie~ say in substance that they 
could make a lot of money out of this, it is still a mere 
guess as to what the transaction was. The exchange of 
money at the till in a store between the proprietor and 
another is not inconsistent with innocence, and the sug-
gestion that two persons in a store having a transaction 
involving the passing of money may make some money 
out of it, is not inconsistent with innocence. These words 
quoted by Lack and Young are the only words uttered 
by Harries in this case touching this transaction, except 
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his denial under oath at the trial. I submit that the whole 
mass and mess of testimony of transactions in Carbon 
County, involving Ossana and l\1yers and Diamanti and 
all those things, do not tend to prove corruption by 
Harries. The only evidence of a tip off of London's ex-
pected visit is that produced by Lack and Ossana, and 
it is not corroborative. If there was a phony proceeding 
against Ossana in furtherance of the agreement under 
which the bribe was passed, as the State claimed, and 
the accomplismnent of the purpose of the bribe is a part 
of the charge, then the claim of Lack would have to be 
corroborated. The raid, the seizure, the papers in libel, 
and the court proceedings for order of sale, and sale, 
and buying back, and all of that were regular proce-
dure. If that was a phony, we have all been phony. Is 
there a judge who has not signed papers like those? Is 
there a lawyer at the bar who touches these things, who 
has not gone to court with papers like those? 
The overall fact of this thing is that under the lib-
eral tolerant pol~cy of the Utah Liquor Control Commis-
sion with respect to clubs, these proceedings do not sug-
gest corruption. There was, I believe, a universal opinion 
among those in the know that Robert S. Harries was 
incorruptible. He has never been accused by anyone 
except Cyrus V. Lack. 
State v. Somers, 97 Ut. 132, 90 P. (2d) 273. 
State v. Lay, 38 Ut. 143, 110 P. 986, 987. 
State v. Butterfield, 70 Ut. 529, 261 P. 804. 
State v. Park, 44 Ut. 360, 140 P. 768. 
State v. Kimball, 45 Ut. 443, 146 P. 313. 
State v. Powell, 45 Ut. 193, 143 P. 588. 
State v. Bridwell, 48 Ut. 97, 158 P. 710. 
State v. Baum, 47 Ut. 7, 151 P. 518. 
State v. Frisby~ 49 Ut. 227, 162 P. 616. 
State v. Elmer, 49 Ut. 6, 161 P. 167. 
State v. Cox, 74 Ut. 149, 277 P. 972. 
State v. Gardner, 83 Ut. 145, 27 P. (2d) 51. 
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VI. The Instructions. (a) The defendant· requested 
the court to instruct the jury as follows : 
And you are further instructed i~ this case that 
the statements or admissions of the defendant, the 
accused, are not sufficient with the testimony of an 
accomplice alone to warrant a conviction. (Tr. 33.) 
Under the evidence in this case and the law, the 
defendant was entitled to this instruction and it. was 
error for the court to refuse it. 
(b) The defendant requested the court to instruct 
the jury as follows : 
You are instructed that the defendant is being 
tried, and is to be tried by you in this case, solely 
upon the charge contained in the indictment, and no 
other. Any intimation of any other misconduct is, 
in the consideration of the evidence here, to be elim-
inated entirely from your minds. As to any other 
collateral matters, you do not know what contra-
dictior or defense or explanation the defendant may 
have. He does not have the opportunity here to 
defend against such matters, and could not be al-
lowed to defend against such things in this trial if 
he wanted to. Your deliberation should, therefore, 
be confined solely to the charge here made and the 
evidence as to this charge. ( Tr. 34.) 
The defendant was entitled to an instruction in this 
case limiting the consideration of the jury to the charge. 
There was a mass of testimony in the case concerning 
other alleged transactions· between Lack and the defen-
dant reflecting misconduct, and a great deal of testimony 
was offered by the State to show that the defendant, 
Harries, while at a night club engaged in drinking and 
in a brawl, and that while at Price, in Carbon County, 
was under the influence of liquor. He was entitled to 
have the jury instructed that these matters were not 
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the questions for their consideration and that they should 
not consider them. 
(c) The court failed to instruct the jury upon all 
of the law of the case and matters upon which the jury 
must of necessity have been instructed in this case, and 
upon the evidence received by the court in evidence and 
introduced by the State over the objection of the defen-
dant, and the limitation and extent to which said evidence 
might be considered by the jury, particularly with re-
spect to the nun1erous and divers matters of hearsay 
and conversations between Cyrus V. Lack, the witness, 
and the several persons, and out of the presence of the 
defendant, and relating to other and different trans-
actions than that charged in the indictment. (Tr. 877.) 
(d) If it was proper for the court to submit to the 
jury the evidence of other offenses as limited by the 
court's instruction No.6, the defendant would be entitled 
to an instruction that the witnesses who testified con-
cerning such other offenses by themselves and in which 
they were culpably implicated were accomplices as mat-
ter of law, and that before the proof of such other of-
fenses could be considered corroboration of each thereof 
would be required. This is the basis of the assignment 
of error No. 45. 
VII. The motion for new trial. 
The motion for new trial was made upon the statu-
tory grounds and should have been granted upon the 
errors hereinbefore pointed out. 
In addition thereto, the motion contained a ground 
of a special pertinency, viz : 
"1. That the jury received evidence other than that 
resulting from a view of the premises. 
2. That the jury received communications out of 
court referring to the cause." (Tr. 49.) 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These grounds were supported by affidavit of coun-
sel for the defendant that the jury received a statement 
and communication made by His Excellency, the Gover-
nor of the State of Utah, the Honorable Herbert B. 
Maw, during the course of the trial, and on or about the 
16th day of September, 1948, which the Governor had 
made and issued and caused to be published in the 
Deseret News, a daily newspaper having a wide circula-
tion in Salt Lake County where the case was tried, and 
throughout the State of Utah and of which members of 
the jury were then subscribers, and which statement was 
evidentiary in character and upon and specifically relat-
ing to the testimony that had been given by witnesses 
at the trial of the cause and which was calculated to 
affect the deliberations of the jury in this cause, and did; 
that the statement and publication came to the notice 
of and was read by members of the jury trying the case 
and was widely comniented upon among the people in 
the court room and in the hearing of the jury and among 
the large concourse of people who attended upon the 
trial; that the publication of the statement by the Gover-
nor had a strong influence and affected the verdict in 
this cause adversely to the defendant and prevented him 
from having a fair trial. A copy of the Deseret News 
containing said statement so issued by the Governor and 
printed in the paper and circulated, is attached to the 
affidavit. (Tr. 54.) · 
It is respectfully submitted, that the judgment of 
conviction in this case ought to be set aside, and that the 
cause be remanded for a new trial. 
ARTHUR WOOLLEY, 
Attorney for defendant and appellant. 
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